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RECENT DECISIONS
property not in existence at the time the mortgage was made and
recorded.
1 4
In the instant case it was held that there was no express agree-
ment that the personalty should become part of the realty and that
the facts did not indicate such an intent. But quaere, what if it did
affirmatively appear from the facts and circumstances that the maker
of the mortgage intended that the after-acquired personalty should be
deemed within the coverage of the mortgage, and it was then pur-
chased under a conditional sales contract or a chattel mortgage? The
result would be the same. The mortgagor's intention could not affect
the rights of the conditional vendor which would be prior to the rights
of the first mortgagee, because title to the chattels would still be in the
conditional vendor and not in the owner of the property. The mort-
gagor could not mortgage property he did not own. It would appear,
however, that the mortgage under these circumstances would cover
the owner's equity in the chattels and upon satisfaction of the condi-
tional sales contract or chattel mortgage, the personalty would come
within the coverage of the mortgage in equity.15
F. D. M.
SALEs - BREACH OF WARRANTY - DEATH ACTION UNDER
DECEDENT ESTATE LAW SECTION 130.-An action was brought to
recover for the wrongful death of plaintiff's wife. The defendant
offered provisions and foodstuffs for sale to the public as part of its
retail business. Among said foodstuffs were pork frankfurters or
sausages, a quantity of which the deceased purchased and consumed,
contracting therefrom the disease of trichinosis, of which she died.
The plaintiff sought recovery on the theory of breach of the implied
warranty of fitness for use. Held, breach of the implied warranty
that the food was fit for human consumption was such a "default" or
"wrongful act" as to bring the case within the purview of Section 130
"' Prudential Insurance Co. v. Sanford Real Estate Corp., 157 Misc. 563,
284 N. Y. Supp. 73 (1935), af'd, 246 App. Div. 567, 282 N. Y. Supp. 840 (4th
Dept. 1935). The mortgage is subject to the construction enjoined by statute
(REAL PROP. LAW § 54) notwithstanding that it contains, in addition to the
words of the statutory form, other provisions. Property not on the premises
when the mortgage was given could not be covered by the mortgage unless it
became a part of the realty. The mortgage could not cover personal property
not then in existence. Cf. Perfect Lighting Fixtures Co. v. Grubar Realty
Corp., 228 App. Div. 141, 239 N. Y. Supp. 286 (1st Dept. 1930).
' Kribbs v. Alford, 120 N. Y. 519, 24 N. E. 811 (1890); Rochester v.
Rasey, 142 N. Y. 570, 37 N. E. 632 (1894).
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of the New York Decedent Estate Law.1  Greco v. S. S. Kresge &
Co., 277 N. Y. 26, 12 N. E. (2d) 562 (1938).
It is a condition to recovery in a death action that the wrong be
of such a nature that had death not ensued, defendant would have
been liable to the decedent.2 It is also a well established rule of law
that in the retail sale of foodstuffs the seller impliedly warrants that
the food is wholesome. 3 Therefore, in the instant case, had the de-
cedent not died, an action predicated on breach of warranty would
have accrued to the said party.4 Apparently the cases which have
been adjudicated determining whether or not an action pursuant to
Section 130 of the Decedent Estate Law exists have been based on
principles of pure tort.5 The reason for this limitation is easily under-
'N. Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW § 130,: "* ** The executor or administrator
*** of a decedent who has left him or her surviving a husband, wife, or next
of kin, may maintain an action to recover damages for a wrongful act, neglect
or default, by which the decedent's death was caused, against a natural person
who, * * * would have been liable to an action in favor of the decedent*** if
death had not ensued * * *."
'Ibid.; see (1938) 12 ST. JOHN's L. Rv. 362.
IN. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 96; Race v. Krum, 222 N. Y. 410, 118 N. E.
853 (1918) (New York rule); Ward v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co.,
231 Mass. 90, 120 N. E. 225 (1918) (reason for rule) ; Rinaldi v. Mohican Co.,
225 N. Y. 70, 121 N. E. 471 (1918) (criticism of rule) ; Parks v. G. C. Yost
Pie Co., 93 Kan. 334, 144 Pac. 202 (1914) ; Hauk v. Berg, 105 S. W. 1176
(1907); Farrel v. Manhattan Market Co., 198 Mass. 571, 84 N. E. 481
(1908) ; Gearing v. Beikson, 223 Mass. 257, 111 N. E. 785 (1914) ; cf. Pelletier
v. Dupont, 124 Md. 269, 1-28 Atl. 186 (1925) (where it was held that if the
selection of the food is left to the judgment and skill of the dealer, the general
rule of caveat emptor applies and the dealer is not liable, in the absence of
knowledge by him that the provisions are unsound).
For common law rule see 3 BL. Comm. 165: "In contracts for provisions it
is always implied that they are sound."; see also 35 Cyc. 407, and authorities
cited.
' N. Y. PERS. PRop. LAW § 96.
SThaggard v. Vafes, 218 Ala. 609, 119 So. 647 (1928) ; Ludwig v. Johnson,
243 Ky. 534, 49 S. W. (2d) 347 (1932) ; La Goy v. Director General of Rail-
roads, 231 N. Y. 191, 131 N. E. 886 (1921) ("One can not recover for the
death of another unless the latter was exercising ordinary care for his safety
and his death was the'result of defendant's negligence") ; Emery v. Rochester
Telephone Corp., 271 N. Y. 306, 3 N. E. (2d) 434'(1936) (§ 130 of DEC. EsT.
LAW enacted to alleviate the harshness of the common law rule that an action
for tort did not survive the death of the injured party); Pearlman v. Garrod
Shoe Co., 276 N. Y. 172, 11 N. E. (2d) 718 (1937) (In which a parent, relying
upon an express warranty of perfect construction of shoes, bought the shoes.
A defect in them having caused the death of her daughter, it was held that
recovery could be had on the theory of negligence but not on warranty, because
infant had no contract with the defendant); Lichtenstern v. Augusta-Aiken
R. and E. Co., 165 App. Div. 270, 150 N. Y. Supp. 992 (1st Dept. 1914);
Griffin v. Bles, 202 Apt. Div. 443, 195 N. Y. Supp. 654 (3d Dept. 1922) ; 13 Cyc.
318 (In most cases the question of the right to recover for the death of a
person by wrongful act is merely a question of negligence and is to be governed
by the same principles and considerations as questions of negligence where the
results are less serious).
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stood from the historical development of death actions.6  The tortious
act, however, need not necessarily be based upon the theory of negli-
gence,7 but may find its source in a breach of contract or warranty
involving violation of a duty.8  In the instant case the defendant, in
breaching the warranty of wholesomeness, also violated a duty im-
posed by law predicated on considerations of public health and public
policy.9 Thus, although the action was brought on implied warranty,
the breach was a wrongful act, a default, and in its essential nature, d
tort. ° This tortious aspect is further augmented by the historical
development of a breach of warranty."
Although it must still be regarded as current law that an action
to be included within the scope of the Decedent Estate Law must be
tortious in nature,' 2 if not in form, there is undoubtedly a judicial
trend to alleviate the hardships caused thereby.' 3 The statute has, in
keeping with the legislative intent,14 been liberally construed by the
courts, 15 and in the present case there is dicta that the shadowy line
of distinction between the realm of contract and that of tort 'I should
not be allowed to defeat an otherwise sound action.17 In order to
'At common law an action for personal injury abated at the death of the
injured party. Hamilton v. Erie R. R., 219 N. Y. 343, 350, 114 N. E. 399, 402
(1916) ; Roche v. St. John's Riverside Hospital, 96 Misc. 289, 297, 160 N. Y.
Supp. 401, 406, aff'd, 176 App. Div. 885, 161 N. Y. Supp. 1143 (2d Dept. 1916).
The death statutes were enacted to alleviate the harshness of this common law
rule. Emery v. Rochester Telephone Corp., 271 N. Y. 308, 310, 3 N. E. (2d)
434, 437 (1936). However, these statutes did not change the common law rule
but, rather, provided a new remedy. Whitford v. Panama R. R., 23 N. Y. 465
(1861); Hamilton V. Erie, supra.
The first death statute was 9 & 10 Vicr., c. 93. The court in the instant
case at 35, in referring to this statute said: "It is clear from the title and
wording of the act, the circumstances surrounding its passage, and from deci-
sions affecting its application, that it was intended to relate only to actions that
are tortious in nature." Our statutes are similar in wording and legislative
intent. Instant case at 35.
Schloendarff v. N. Y. Hospital, 211 N. Y. 125, 105 N. E. 92 (1914).8 Thaggard v. Vafes, 218 Ala. 609, 119 So. 647 (1928) ("Though mere
breach of contract is not a wrongful or negligent act, within the scope of the
statute giving a right of action for wrongful death, the negligent or tortious
breach of duty to the person whose death is caused thereby is within the
statute, though such duty arises out of contract" ) ; Roche v. St. John's River-
side Hospital, 96 Misc. 289, 160 N. Y. Supp. 401, aff'd, 17 App. Div. 885,
161 N. Y. Supp. 1143 (2d Dept 1916).
IN. Y. PERs. Peop. LAW § 96; Race v. Krum, 222 N. Y. 410, 118 N. E. 853
(1918).
" Instant case at 35; see (1934) 8 ST. J]OHN's L. REv. 363.
"Prior to the action for assumpsit the remedy for breach of warranty was
an action for deceit. AMEs, Lpcrmus ON LEGAL HisToRY (1913) 36.
See notes 5, 6, supra.
Emery v. Rochester Telephone Corp., 271 N. Y. 308, 310, 3 N. E. (2d)
434, 437 (1936).
" Van Beech v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U. S. 342, 57 Sup. Ct. 452 (1937).
'Instant case at 36.
"Instant case at 35; cf. Rich v. N. Y. Cent. and H. R. R., 87 N. Y. 382(1882).
" See note 13, mpra.
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obviate the apparent difficulties encountered in seeking relief in tort
under the Decedent Estate Law, the plaintiff may have had recourse to
contract had he so elected. 18 The action, if such were the case, would
be instituted on the sole theory of breach of warranty. Obviously, in
following that procedure the plaintiff would be suing for the benefit
of decedent's estate 20 rather than in behalf of the next of kin. The
damages recoverable in the contract action would have been all the
damages suffered by deceased consequentially resulting from the
breach. However, the advisability of proceeding under that theory is
questionable when one considers the enhanced compensation available
in the death action. It is the concensus of judicial opinion that in
proceedings for breach of contract the relief afforded should be limited
to the actual damages suffered by the injured party himself.2 1 This
would, obviously, preclude a third party from maintaining suit in his
own behalf.22 In a death action the plaintiff would be allowed to move
that the jury take into consideration, in computing the damages, such
future pecuniary losses that the beneficiaries under the statute would
suffer.23 The comparative desirability, therefore, of proceeding under
the Decedent Estate Law rather than in contract is self-evident.
J.R.P.
TAXATION-FEDERAL GIFT TAx-ESTATES BY THE ENTIRETY.
-Plaintiff and his wife acquired realty in Indiana as tenants by the
entirety. The plaintiff paid the sum of $300,000, personally furnish-
ing the entire consideration. The collector of internal revenue taxed
this transaction as a gift of the purchased realty to the wife. Plaintiff
recovered in the District Court the $16,582 which he paid under pro-
test. On appeal, held, reversed. Where a wife gets realty as a tenant
by the entirety, without paying any consideration therefor, she is a
N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 96.
' See note 3, supra.
N. Y. DEc. EsT. LAW § 116; Hamilton v. Erie R. R., 219 N. Y. 343,
114 N. E. 399 (1916).
Orester v. Dayton Rubber Manufacturing Co., 228 N. Y. 134, 126 N. E.
510 (1920); Hallock v. Becher and Sackett, 42 Barb. 199 (N. Y. 1864).
' Because of lack of privity no cause of action arises in favor of or
against a stranger to the contract. Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 235 N. Y.
468, 139 N. E. 576 (1923).
I Oldfield v. Harlem R. R., 14 N. Y. (4 Kern) 310 (1856); Tilley v.
Hudson River R. R., 29 N. Y. 252 (1864); H ll v. Germain, 131 N. Y. 536,
30 N. E. 591 (1892) ; Sternfels v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 174 N. Y. 512, 66 N.
E. 1117 (1903) (in an action for wrongful death, mortality tables are admissible
to establish decedent's expectancy of life).
